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 PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION THAT GOES BACK to 
Aristotle represents childhood as a state of lacking. This is the 
view that children are imperfect, because not yet finished, adults.1 
On Tamar Schapiro’s recent version of this view, childhood is a 
predicament because children lack full moral agency.2 Being a child is to 
find oneself at a lower stage of development, a stage that normal 
individuals are expected to leave behind in due course to move on to the 
superior stage of adulthood. Arguably, this view dominates not only the 
philosophical tradition, but also current, everyday thinking about 
childhood. Traditionally, developmental psychology3 assumed that 
children become adults by going through successive stages of intellectual 
and moral development, with each subsequent stage being superior to the 
former.4 I refer to this view of childhood as the “children as unfinished 
adults” view. 
Over the past few centuries, this view of childhood has been 
compensated by the Romantic view of children as natural geniuses, 
human beings not yet morally corrupted by civilization and having 
privileged access to truth by means of intuition. Some of the same 
features that mark childhood as an inferior stage of development in the 
neo-Aristotelian tradition are responsible for the superior standing of 
children in the Romantic one, according to which children’s lack of full 
instrumental rationality is valuable because it allows them to remain 
connected to the rest of nature and humankind, and their emotional 
nature makes possible a degree of spontaneity and creativity usually lost 
in adulthood.5 Here I refer to this view of the relationship between 
childhood and adulthood as the “adults as defective children” view. 
I defend the view that childhood is intrinsically valuable rather than 
                                                            
1 According to Gareth Matthews, this conception still dominates much of the thinking 
about children. See “The Philosophy of Childhood” (2014) in E. Zalta, ed., Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, plato.stanford.edu/entries/childhood. Recent philosophical 
work on childhood confirms that the few major philosophers who have addressed 
children-related issues did not depart from this conception of childhood. See S. Turner 
and G. Matthews, eds. (1998) The Philosopher’s Child: Critical Perspectives in the Western 
Tradition, Rochester: University of Rochester Press. 
2 T. Schapiro (1999) “What Is a Child?” Ethics 109(4): 715-38. 
3 The classic work is by Lawrence Kohlberg. See, for instance (1981) Essays on Moral 
Development, Vol. I: The Philosophy of Moral Development, San Francisco: Harper & Row. 
4 For instance, G. Matthews (1980) Philosophy and the Young Child, Cambridge, Mass. and 
London: Harvard University Press, and G. Matthews (1994) The Philosophy of Childhood, 
Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press. 
5 For the Romantic image of the child, see, for instance, D. Kennedy (2006) Changing 
Conceptions of the Child from the Renaissance to Post-Modernity: A Philosophy of Childhood, 
Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, especially pp. 20-23. Recently, James Dwyer 
put forward a case for the moral superiority of children over adults that is, in spirit, 
Romantic. See (2011) Moral Status and Human Life: The Case for Children’s Superiority, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
A 
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having value only to the extent to which it leads to a good adulthood. 
Neither the “children as unfinished adults” nor the more extravagant 
“adults as defective children” view is by itself convincing because both 
are incomplete ways of telling the story of childhood and adulthood. A 
short article cannot settle the issue of the relative value of childhood and 
adulthood, but I suggest it is plausible that some kinds of value that we 
can fully enjoy as children are, in the case of most people, different from 
those that we can enjoy as adults. As we turn into adults we improve our 
knowledge and abilities: We accumulate experience and gain better 
control of our emotions. Thereby, we become capable of full moral 
agency. Moreover, we become more purposeful and acquire the executive 
abilities necessary to pursue our aims effectively, and thus new types of 
achievements become available to us. At the same time, in the transition 
to adulthood we lose, on average, not only desirable physical skills such 
as agility and flexibility, but also much of the mental plasticity, 
imagination, curiosity and vivid, sometimes synesthetic perception of the 
world (that is, an ability to experience the world through more than one 
sense at a time). In the process, the ability to imagine radically different 
worlds and the philosophical and artistic abilities we had as children are 
on average lost or at least greatly diminished. Therefore, the change from 
childhood to adulthood may not in every way be either progress – as the 
view of “children as unfinished adults” would have it – or regress – as 
suggested by the view of “adults as defective children.” Rather, it is a 
transformation from one intrinsically valuable kind of human being to a 
different intrinsically valuable kind of human being.6 My account draws 
on work in philosophy with children and on new research in 
developmental psychology. While I speak about children in general, it 
goes without saying that claims about children’s abilities apply differently 
to different age groups; yet, I assume that the distinction between 
“childhood” and “adulthood” is, as such, pertinent. 
In the next section I elaborate on the “children as unfinished adults” 
view, explaining its plausibility and normative implications. The third 
section introduces and discusses a heuristic device for investigating the 
value of childhood. The subsequent section explores the reasons why 
childhood has intrinsic and special value: Children possess certain 
valuable abilities to a significantly higher degree than adults and 
childhood is a time when we can fully reap the intrinsic benefit of 
experimentation and variety. For these and other reasons children can 
lead good lives on several understandings of well-being: as a pleasurable 
state, as the satisfaction of simple desires or as the realization of certain 
objective goods. (But I do not commit to a particular conception of 
children’s well-being.7) The fourth section addresses the objection that 
children’s lack of moral agency precludes them from leading good lives, 
and therefore that childhood cannot have intrinsic value. A short 
                                                            
6 And whether it is progress, regress or neither depends on whether the value of 
adulthood is greater, lesser or roughly equal to that of childhood. I do not discuss this 
issue here but I come back to it toward the end of the paper. 
7 See, for instance, A. Skelton (forthcoming) “Two Conceptions of Children’s Welfare,” 
Journal of Practical Ethics. 
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discussion of the view that adults are defective children follows in section 
five, and I conclude by sketching a conception that acknowledges the 
truth in both the “children as unfinished adults” and “adults as defective 
children” views – and thus transcends both. 
 
1. The “Children As Unfinished Adults” View 
 
According to Schapiro’s influential account, the condition of childhood 
is, essentially, a predicament. A child is an underdeveloped human being, 
unable yet to act on reasons of her own and therefore lacking in moral 
agency. Unlike an adult, who can “speak in her own voice, the voice of 
one who stands in a determinate, authoritative relation to the various 
motivational forces within her,” a child is an agent who “is not yet in a 
position to speak in her own voice because there is no voice which 
counts as hers.”8 This is because children have not yet undergone the 
process of “becoming themselves,” that is, of settling on reasons for 
action, reasons that the child herself endorses and with which she 
identifies. On this (Kantian) view, moral agency requires precisely this 
kind of identification with one’s reasons for action. Therefore, children 
necessarily lack moral agency, which makes paternalistic behavior toward 
them legitimate. According to Schapiro, childhood is a time of 
experimentation – mainly through play – aimed at creating such a self, or 
voice, of one’s own. The essential task of children is to turn themselves 
into agents capable of moral agency, and adults have a duty to help them 
in this process. Shapiro thinks we adults ought to make “children’s 
dependence our enemy”9 – that is, to help children get over childhood as 
quickly as possible, for instance, by encouraging (or perhaps demanding) 
that children take on adult responsibilities as early as possible as long as 
we do not require children to perform tasks that are beyond their abilities. 
Requiring too much of children, on this view, is objectionable merely 
because it is likely to entrench dependence instead of curing it. 
An extreme form of the view that a child is an unfinished adult 
represents childhood as a misfortune, and explains the duty to help 
children grow up as a duty to avoid such misfortune. Loren Lomasky’s 
account suggests that children are morally on a par with cognitively 
incapacitated adults because neither such adults nor children can be 
proper project pursuers. In a section about “defective human beings,” he 
writes that: 
 
were one condemned … to remain a child throughout one’s existence, or to 
grow in bulk without simultaneously growing in the capacity to conceptualize 
ends and to act for their sake, it would be a personal misfortune of the utmost 
gravity.10 
 
                                                            
8 Schapiro (1999: 729). For a similar view, see N. Richards (2010) The Ethics of Parenthood, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
9 Schapiro (1999: 737). 
10 Lomasky (1987) Persons, Rights and the Moral Community, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 202. 
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Non-Kantians, too, have seen childhood as valuable only as a path to 
adulthood. According to Michael Slote, “what happens in childhood 
principally affects our view of total lives through the effects that 
childhood success or failure are supposed to have on mature 
individuals.”11 Thus, Slote discounts the achievements of childhood, 
which he thinks are of trivial importance compared to adult 
achievements; while the failures of childhood are so insignificant that they 
count for nothing in determining how good one’s life was overall.12 Neo-
Aristotelians like Slote have several reasons to think that childhood has 
value only as preparation for adulthood: Human beings are biological 
organisms whose good is partly determined by biological aims and 
adulthood is the only period of life when one is capable of biological 
success measured by an ability to reproduce. Similarly, if moral value is to 
be identified with the exercise of virtue, only adults can aspire to moral 
goodness since they have had the time to acquire and perfect the exercise 
of virtues. 
If either of these accounts of childhood were correct, they would 
entail that childhood has only extrinsic value, that is, that childhood’s 
value depends on whether on not it performs the function of preparing 
individuals for a good adulthood – whether the goodness of adulthood is 
given by the acquisition of (moral) agency, or by reproductive fitness, or 
by the mastery of virtues. Without denying the truth in the view that 
children are unfinished adults, I challenge its completeness. Children 
display some valuable features to a greater extent than adults, and while, 
on average, they may lack the ability to accomplish the same valuable 
goals as adults, children are better able than adults to engage in processes 
that are valuable in themselves. 
But first it is worth explaining the normative importance of this 
issue. Any view of childhood and of its relative value compared to 
adulthood has important practical implications. If childhood was indeed 
merely an inferior stage of development then it would be desirable to 
overcome it as quickly as possible; ceteris paribus, it would benefit 
individuals to quickly turn into adults. If, instead, childhood had intrinsic 
as well as extrinsic value, then demanding children to grow up as quickly 
as possible might be a mistake. (Whether or not it would be a mistake will 
depend on how the value of childhood compares to that of adulthood. It 
is possible that both stages of life have intrinsic but very unequal value.) 
It could also be an injustice, assuming that one of the duties owed to 
children is to make sure that they can have a good childhood and that 
having a good childhood requires enough time to enjoy it. It may be 
possible to help children learn how to set and pursue adult-like goals for 
themselves efficiently by sacrificing the enjoyment of childhood – that is, 
to help turn them into adults quickly. One way of doing this is by training 
children to successfully assume very early on the responsibilities and 
                                                            
11 In M. Slote (1983) Goods and Virtues, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 14. 
12 At least, if the adulthood is successful. This belief is explained partly by Slote’s belief 
that, in general, later successes make earlier failures irrelevant and partly by his belief 
that the successes and failures of childhood are as unimportant as dreams (which he 
thinks are unimportant). 
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freedoms of adulthood. This, however, would probably require 
shortening the time when they can just be children, that is, to experiment 
for the sake of experimenting, to enjoy learning without worrying about 
mastering knowledge and to pursue beauty without embedding this 
pursuit in larger, goal-oriented projects. Yet, childhood goods such as 
experimenting, enjoyment and process-oriented pursuits seem to have 
value in themselves. In this case, helping children grow up as quickly as 
possible would mean depriving them of something of intrinsic value. 
Doing this is especially objectionable if, as I will argue, childhood also has 
special value, that is, if during childhood we are likely to experience and 
realize valuable things that are a lot less likely to be available to us during 
adulthood. Elsewhere13 I argue that the goods of childhood are good for 
adults, too, and that they are not typically entirely out of adults’ reach. 
However, given biological facts about children (such as underdeveloped 
prefrontal cortices) and other factual constraints (such as the need for 
someone to work in order to ensure survival), adults cannot hope to 
enjoy these goods to the same extent as children. In this sense, childhood 
can have special value although its goods are not themselves special. 
Leaving aside the question of its ideal length, we need a conception 
of childhood in order to determine the entitlements of children and 
adults’ duties toward them. It is noncontroversial that children are 
inevitably more vulnerable than adults, and dependent on them; hence, 
their lives are significantly shaped by the individual adults who raise them 
as well as by the rules and institutions that adults design collectively. 
Children’s vulnerability, together with the inescapable power asymmetry 
between them and adults, constitute a reason to believe that adults are 
collectively responsible for children’s well-being. But, without knowing 
whether childhood ought to be valued as more than mere preparation for 
adulthood, it is impossible to fully specify what is good for a child, how 
important the goods of childhood are for a life well lived and what we 
owe to children. These questions have mundane policy implications, most 
obviously for the ethics and politics of education. Consider, for example, 
two incompatible models of early education that are currently in dispute. 
One of them introduces formal schooling sooner and encourages the 
early acquisition of literacy and numeracy skills, with the explicit aim of 
preparing the future adults to fare better in social and economic 
competitions. The second insists on delaying formal schooling until age 
6–7 and is also concerned with children’s enjoyment of the process of 
learning.14 Beyond their practical recommendations, the two models differ 
in their rationale: The first treats childhood as mere preparation for 
adulthood; the second acknowledges that difficult trade-offs between an 
optimal childhood and an optimal adulthood may be necessary. 
(Incidentally, the second model may also prove better suited to advance 
the interests of children as future adults; this is partly an empirical 
                                                            
13 A. Gheaus (2014) “The ‘Intrinsic Goods of Childhood’ and the Just Society,” in A. 
Bagattini and C. Macleod, eds., The Nature of Children’s Well-Being, Dordrecht: Springer, 
pp. 35-52. 
14 B. Casalini (2014) “The Early Childhood Education and Care Policy Debate in the 
EU,” Interdisciplinary Journal of Family Studies IXX(1): 77-94. 
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matter.) 
As we have seen, philosophers who assume the conception of 
children as unfinished adults tend to hold that the goods of childhood are 
of little, if any, relevance to the overall goodness of a person’s life. Yet, 
some contemporary philosophers reject the “children as unfinished 
adults” conception and argue that having a good childhood is not 
valuable merely because it contributes to a good adulthood. They think 
that we owe children above and beyond what it takes to prepare them for 
good adulthoods.15 The rest of this paper argues that they are right. 
 
2. Brennan’s Thought Experiment 
 
Samantha Brennan has suggested a way to test the assumption that 
childhood is a state of deficiency, valuable only inasmuch as it prepares 
one for adulthood. She asks us to consider “whether one would, if one 
could, simply give children a pill to have them grow up.”16 I assume 
Brennan’s thought experiment is based on the presumption that the pill 
would instantly turn one into the same adult one would have been if she 
had become that adult by natural means – with the same skills, capacities 
and knowledge that one would have normally acquired during the course 
of one’s childhood.17 
Those who endorse the view of children as unfinished adults, 
especially the more extreme version of it, will answer positively: If 
childhood is like a severe disability, it may be rational to skip it. Consider 
the usual intuition that it is regrettable to decline from adult to infant 
mentality. Kamm notes that, if this intuition holds, it may also be 
regrettable to be in a state of infancy for longer than necessary in the 
course of normal species development. But then, it follows that “[i]f 
science ever makes it possible to bypass infancy, we may feel sorry for 
those who go through it.”18 
The question is whether Brennan’s experiment is to be interpreted as 
inviting the individual to choose an overall shorter life as a result of 
skipping childhood. I assume that few believe that childhood has zero or 
negative value such that existing as a child is worse than, or just as good 
as, not existing at all. Therefore, I suggest focusing on the following 
interpretation of Brennan’s question: “Would it be rational for the 
                                                            
15 S. Brennan (2014) “The Goods of Childhood and Children’s Rights,” in F. Baylis and 
C. McLeod, eds., Family-Making: Contemporary Ethical Challenges, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 29-48; C. Macleod (2010) “Primary Goods, Capabilities, and 
Children,” in H. Brighouse and I. Robeyns, eds., Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and 
Capabilities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 174-92; H. Brighouse and A. 
Swift (2014) Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child Relationships, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
16 Brennan (2014). 
17 But if one’s childhood is a constitutive part of one’s adult self, taking a pill cannot, by 
definition, turn one into the same adult one would have been if she had become that 
adult by natural means. I believe this criticism indicates the limited, purely heuristic, 
value of the question. 
18 In F. M. Kamm (1998) Morality, Mortality, Vol. I: Death and Whom to Save from It, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 24, n. 18. 
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individual to skip her childhood and have it replaced with an equal span 
of prime adulthood?” A positive answer to this question could indicate 
one of the following two beliefs: that childhood’s value is entirely 
dependent on it being a necessary path to adulthood, or that the value of 
childhood is intrinsic, but lesser than the value of adulthood. 
Several caveats are necessary. First, the question should be 
understood as an offer to exchange a reasonably good childhood for an 
equally long period of reasonably good adulthood. Without this 
qualification, any answer may merely indicate that people who answer had 
rather bad childhoods. It makes perfect sense that someone with a bad 
childhood may prefer to never have been a child. Also, a complication 
would arise from comparing childhoods and adulthoods of different 
qualities. For instance, it is conceivable that a good childhood is better 
than a good adulthood, and that, at the same time, a bad childhood is 
worse than a bad adulthood because children have much less control over 
their lives than adults have – being in a bad state one cannot hope to 
change may be particularly bad. In assuming that the comparison is 
between reasonably good childhoods and adulthoods I leave this 
complication to one side. Finally, a related complication comes from the 
fact that individuals do not live in a social void; rather, children and adults 
live in a social world structured by adults who, arguably, have a bias 
toward cultivating the goods of adulthood.19 In general, adults collectively 
decide the rules of living together of both children and adults (including 
how much adult supervision children need in order to flourish). So one 
may want to distinguish between two interpretations of Brennan’s 
question. That is, between: 
 
Q1: Would it be rational for the individual to skip her reasonably good 
childhood and have it replaced with an equal span of reasonably good prime 
adulthood, in a world biased toward making possible good adulthoods, but 
relatively disinterested in enabling good childhoods? (Some may find that this 
description approximates the world as is now.) 
 
and 
 
Q2: Would it be rational for the individual to skip her reasonably good 
childhood and have it replaced with an equal span of reasonably good prime 
adulthood, in a world that is socially structured to respect both the value of 
childhood and the value of adulthood? 
 
One may answer Q1 positively because she thinks that childhood, as it is 
possible in that society, is not sufficiently valuable, thus leaving open the 
possibility that she would answer the question negatively in a world that 
shows proper respect to childhood.20 If the heuristic device is to work, 
                                                            
19 As both Matthews (1994) and Dwyer (2011) argue, the first with respect to what kinds 
of intellectual and artistic achievements get social recognition, the second with respect to 
the social organization of childrearing. 
20 There can be significant disagreement about the extent to which leading a good life as 
a child requires adults’ active involvement and help. For an account of what it is for a 
child’s life to go well that assumes that much adult involvement is needed, see L. 
Ferracioli (2014) “The State’s Duty to Ensure that Children Are Loved,” Journal of Ethics 
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Q2 is the relevant question. 
It is tempting to answer Brennan’s question positively, for reasons 
explained in the previous section. Although I shall argue that children are 
rational and possess some valuable cognitive abilities to a uniquely high 
degree, I do not question here that children are unlikely to have their own 
self or be fully competent (moral) agents, nor the relevance of these facts 
for judging the value of childhood. As subjects to legitimate paternalism, 
children cannot be the creators of their own lives to the same extent that 
adults can. But, whatever children lack in comparison to adults, they have 
access to some goods of intrinsic value that are largely unavailable to 
adults. 
 
3. What Makes Childhood Intrinsically Valuable? 
 
In spite of its limitations, a reasonably good childhood can have intrinsic 
and special value. I advance the following argument: 
 
(a) Children are not merely unfinished adults – that is, children are likely to 
posses abilities that adults are likely to have largely lost. These are not trivial 
abilities, but important elements of widely endorsed understandings of a good 
life which, moreover, qualify children for some degree of both rational and 
moral agency; 
(b) The experiencing of a variety of goods is itself a good; 
(b1) childhood is a time of intense experimentation with a variety of interests 
and relationships, which is itself a good; and 
(b2) children and adults have privileged access to different goods, hence the 
experience of having been a child contributes to the overall value of a life 
above and beyond its contribution to a better adulthood. 
(c) In virtue of (a) and (b), children are capable – especially in a world that 
properly accommodates childhood – to enjoy well-being understood as the 
realization of some objective goods to which adults have little access. This is 
not to deny that the range of goods achievable by children may be more 
limited than the range of goods achievable by adults. 
 
(a) 
 
The view of children as unfinished adults draws plausibility from an 
assumption that very young children are irrational, older children are 
imperfectly rational and, as they grow up, children become increasingly 
more rational. This assumption is present outside philosophy, too. Gareth 
Matthews has argued that Jean Piaget’s theory of children’s development 
methodologically assumes children’s imperfect rationality and hence the 
conception of children as unfinished adults. According to Matthews, 
Piaget’s methodological commitments explain why he discounted the 
philosophical remarks of his child subjects and, in general, children’s 
ability to engage – sometimes better than adults – with basic 
philosophical questions.21 It is difficult to deny that children’s minds seem 
at times very different from adults’ minds. But is this difference best 
understood as merely one of degree of rationality – such that older children 
                                                                                                                                             
& Social Philosophy 8(2). 
21 See n. 4. 
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can at best only approximate adult rationality – or are children usually in 
possession of different cognitive abilities than adults? Below I sketch the 
case for the latter view. 
Research in philosophy and developmental psychology suggests that 
children are endowed with cognitive abilities that most individuals 
inevitably lose to a large degree as they grow up. Taken together, these 
theories show that and explain why children are very fast and imaginative 
learners, capable of raising basic philosophical questions and sometimes 
of coming up with solutions to these questions. According to these 
theories, children are also generally better than adults at imagining 
alternative worlds. 
In the ’70s, Gareth Matthews started to engage, systematically and 
self-consciously, in philosophical conversations with children – first 
informally, then in school programs. He also collected anecdotal evidence 
about children’s philosophical questions and remarks in conversations 
with other adults. According to Matthews, some children – without 
prompting from adults – raise questions, make comments and even 
engage in reasoning that professional philosophers can recognize as 
philosophical. The abundant examples discussed by Matthews in his 
various works include ontological questions (“If there was a big bang or 
something, what was the big bang in?”), epistemological questions (“How 
can we be sure that everything is not a dream?”) and moral questions 
(“Why is it better for three people to be selfish [and get what they want] 
rather than only one [and get what he wants]?”). Even more strikingly, 
Matthews noted that, until the onset of puberty, children are, on average, 
better able than adults to engage with, and sometimes generate, basic 
philosophical questions about the nature of reality, knowledge and 
morality.22 His claim is that young children produce more interesting 
philosophical questions and remarks, partly thanks to the breadth and 
vividness of their curiosity and to the fact that their thinking has not yet 
been too affected by conventional views. Before reaching puberty, we are, 
on average, easier to interest in philosophical exchange, and the 
nonconforming responses of young children are “much more likely to be 
the fruit of honest reflection”23 than the more conventional things that 
older individuals say. Matthews (like others) also notes, but discusses less, 
the possibility that children’s artistic abilities are, on average, superior to 
those of adults; children are better able to produce aesthetically 
worthwhile drawings than adults who are not professional artists. Some 
art historians seem to agree: They observe that many (adult) modernist 
artists appreciated, and claimed to be inspired by, children’s art.24 This, of 
course, does not mean that the highest philosophical or artistic 
                                                            
22 Matthews’ views on children’s ability to engage with philosophy have been challenged, 
mostly on grounds that children are incapable of the complex and relentless enquiry that 
we often praise as the main philosophical accomplishment. His critics, however, do not 
deny children’s unusual ability to generate genuine philosophical questions, which is the 
relevant claim in this paper. 
23 Matthews (1980: 38). See also remarks at 73. 
24 J. Fineberg (1997) The Innocent Eye: Children’s Art and the Modern Artist, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
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achievements tend to come from children; rather, the claim is that those 
individuals who do not grow up to be philosophers or artists (that is, the 
majority of people) are likely to have been better at raising philosophical 
questions and pursuing beauty as children than as adults. 
Recent work in neuroscience and developmental psychology 
provides a plausible explanation of why children have different valuable 
abilities than adults. In a nutshell, the message – in Alison Gopnik’s 
words – is that: 
 
We used to think that babies and young children were irrational, egocentric, 
and amoral. Their thinking and experience were concrete, immediate, and 
limited. In fact, psychologists and neuroscientists have discovered that babies 
not only learn more, but imagine more, care more, and experience more than 
we would ever have thought possible. In some ways, young children are 
actually smarter, more imaginative, more caring, and even more conscious than 
adults are.25 
 
For now, I focus on the first and last of the above features: young 
children’s cognitive abilities and the peculiarities of their sensorial 
experience. Not only are children spontaneously good at formulating 
(basic) philosophical questions but, according to Gopnik, Andrew 
Meltzoff and Patricia Kuhl, they are also good at spontaneously adopting 
a scientific frame of mind in looking at the world. Babies and toddlers 
“think, draw conclusions, make predictions, look for explanations, and 
even do experiments.”26 During childhood, mental plasticity is much 
higher than in adulthood, that is, children are particularly able to learn in 
light of new experiences. As with philosophy, children of course rarely 
break new ground in science.27 They lack the experience necessary for 
such achievements; they have not yet had time to learn how to build on 
the work of many generations of scientists. The claim is that, on average, 
children use scientific methods more extensively than adults; they 
investigate causal relations, make predictions and generally pursue 
explanations. 
Gopnik explains children’s outstanding cognitive abilities by appeal 
to specific features of their brains. Hers is an evolutionary story: 
Children’s prefrontal cortices are not yet fully developed and hence they 
lack strong prefrontal control. Prefrontal control is necessary for the 
inhibition of information that is not vital to performing a specific task, 
which is particularly useful if one is trying to accomplish such a task. At 
the same time, by helping narrow down focus, prefrontal control impedes 
general learning and free use of imagination. In Gopnik’s words: “To be 
imaginative, you want to consider as many possibilities as you can, even 
wild and unprecedented ones. … In learning, you want to remain open to 
                                                            
25 A. Gopnik (2009) The Philosophical Baby: What Children’s Minds Tell Us About Truth, Love, 
and the Meaning of Life, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, p. 5. 
26 A. Gopnik, A. Meltzoff and P. Kuhl (2008/1999) The Scientist in the Crib: What Early 
Learning Tells Us About the Mind, HarperCollins e-books, p. X. 
27 But see occasional news stories about children like Kathryn and Nathan Gray 
discovering supernovas, or Jack Andraka devising medical tests. 
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anything that may turn out to be the truth.”28 The lack of prefrontal 
control explains why children learn fast and display more of the open 
mind necessary for philosophical and scientific investigation than adults. 
Children’s lack of a prefrontal cortex benefits humanity as a whole, 
because, in order to make progress, human beings need to first acquire 
enough of the huge amount of knowledge accumulated over generations. 
At the same time, a developed prefrontal cortex and, with it, prefrontal 
control, gives adults the benefit of discrimination and focus necessary to 
accomplish tasks (whether philosophical, scientific or practical). 
According to Gopnik, we as a species owe our evolutionary success to 
the mental flexibility, adaptability and creativity that make it possible for 
us to constantly improve our environment. In turn, these are possible 
thanks to a division of labor between childhood and adulthood: 
Imagination is trained during the particularly long and dependency-ridden 
human childhood and, as adults, we learn how to translate imagination 
into reality. 
If Matthews and Gopnik et al. are correct, children tend to possess 
or exercise cognitive and creative abilities that in most adults have been 
lost or significantly diminished. These abilities are not trivial: They give 
children access to important goods, such as being philosophically and 
scientifically minded. Being this kind of individual may be valuable even if 
one cannot make much use these abilities – for instance, if as a child one 
does not find many adults willing to engage in philosophical discussions 
or in attempts to explore the causal explanation of the world. The mere 
intellectual curiosity of children seems valuable independently of how it 
contributes to knowledge. But it appears to be particularly valuable in a 
world that makes it possible for children to enjoy the exercise of those 
abilities that they possess to the greatest extent: curiosity, easy learning 
and a propensity to enquire into general issues. This provides pro tanto 
reasons against forsaking childhood for more adulthood-time, particularly 
in circumstances that are conducive to good childhoods, that is, a world 
in which children’s creativity and learning are being properly 
accommodated. (Although, in fact, no imaginable social conditions can 
fully inhibit some exercise of children’s learning and creative abilities. 
According to the developmental picture advanced by Gopnik and others, 
children would never become functioning adults without some exercise 
of these abilities. One therefore has reason to answer even Q1 negatively.) 
When addressing point (c), below, I argue that, in a world shaped to give 
children ample opportunities to learn and be creative, children’s unique 
cognitive abilities give them access to valuable goods – such as 
engagement with philosophical, scientific and artistic pursuits – that are 
less accessible to adults. 
 
(b1) 
 
If mental plasticity is indeed a distinctive mark of childhood, this helps 
explain, and gives credence to, the claim that children do not have “selves 
                                                            
28 Gopnik (2009: 13). 
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of their own.” Schapiro, for instance, thinks that children are not able to 
make morally authoritative choices because they are not yet the authors 
of their own selves; they have not yet decided – or completed the tasks of 
deciding – upon reflection, who they are. 
It is sometimes argued that children need to experiment with 
different selves in order to arrive at a stable self. If so, experimentation is 
instrumentally valuable. This is how Schapiro, for instance, understands 
the importance of play: “By engaging in play, children more or less 
deliberately ‘try on’ selves to be and worlds to be in. This is because the 
only way a child can ‘have’ a self is by trying one on.”29 Without disputing 
here children’s limited sense of a stable self, or the value of having one, I 
suggest that there is also something intrinsically valuable in the 
experimentation made possible by children’s alleged lack of such a self. 
More generally, it may be valuable for an individual to enjoy a variety of 
goods. 
Consider the following analogy: Some people try out various 
occupations before they decide on a stable, long-term career. They 
experiment with temporary jobs, at times doing very different things. (A 
variation on this theme is teenagers or young adults taking a “gap year” 
before continuing studies or before embarking on a career.) This can be 
instrumentally helpful because it lets people know where their strongest 
interests and abilities lie, and hence helps them optimize their future 
professional success. But it also seems to have intrinsic value by 
contributing to a more complete life, in one respect, than the life of 
someone who has only done one kind of work throughout their entire 
life. In the same way, many adults who eventually settle in a long-term 
relationship have had several transitory lovers. Many think this is a 
desirable path toward eventually settling down – perhaps a variety of 
lovers helps one discover through firsthand experience what one is really 
seeking from intimate relationships. But the good of experimenting need 
not be limited to advancing to more successful, stable relationships later 
in life. There also may be something intrinsically valuable in having 
experienced intimacy with several people before deciding what one 
mostly wants to pursue; experimentation and variety may be constitutive 
of a flourishing life. It is not just that a long-term relationship is more 
likely to be good thanks to previous, more experimental ones; 
independently from the instrumental value of having had several 
relationships, the relational aspect of one’s life, as a whole, is richer and 
thereby better all things considered. Experimenting with work and 
intimacy not only may generate the security that one really knows what one 
wants but also a sense of having lived a more complete life in these 
respects than somebody who settles right away into a long-term job or 
relationship. 
Similarly, the intense experimentation with sensations, ideas and 
selves of a well-lived childhood has intrinsic value because it can make 
the overall life of the individual more complete than it could possibly be 
if one took the “instant adulthood pill.” The value may consist in 
                                                            
29 Schapiro (1999: 732). 
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experimentation itself, or perhaps it is a constitutive element of 
experimentation that has intrinsic value. Children’s experimentation, as 
Andrew Franklin-Hall suggests, affords “a form of freedom much scarcer 
in adulthood, namely, a freedom from having to make certain decisions 
with long-term consequences.”30 Adults, too, can experiment, but the 
choices that they can make that have few long-term consequences are 
typically restricted to trivial matters – what to eat, or what to wear, on a 
particular day. By contrast, children are free to experiment with important 
things like commitments or relationships without having to face the same 
long-term consequences as adults. Even if the pill turned the individual 
into the best adult she could have possibly become, the life of that person, 
on the whole, seems poorer for its lack of childhood experimentation. 
How persuasive this claim is will depend not only on how apt one 
thinks the analogies are, but also on the relevance of the following, 
perfectionistic objection. One may think that attaining various forms of 
excellence – as in exercising a skill to perfection, uncovering new 
knowledge or producing a beautiful work of art – is the highest good; it is 
also a very time-consuming one. On this view, experimenting is desirable 
only to the extent that it is instrumental to attaining excellence, but 
undesirable insofar as it distracts from its pursuit. If one could have more 
time as an adult – that is, as an individual better able to successfully attain 
excellence – then it would be rational, on this account, to take the 
“instant-adulthood pill.” A conception of the good in which attaining 
excellence is the only good seems unavoidably inimical to the idea that 
childhood has intrinsic value. For those who hold a more pluralistic view, 
in which attaining excellence is only one of the things that makes lives go 
well, there is the following rejoinder: Most lives are sufficiently long for 
achieving some excellence without having to forsake experimentation. In 
this day and age there is room for both in a human life of average length. 
 
(b2) 
 
Even without thinking that there is intrinsic value in the unique 
experimentation of childhood, one may see that children have privileged 
access to some goods, made possible by their unique abilities to get 
involved in processes of discovery and in aesthetic pursuits. In this case, 
if it is valuable for an individual to enjoy a variety of goods then the 
experience of having been a child contributes to the overall value of a life 
above and beyond its contribution to a better adulthood. 
 
(c) 
 
Drawing on (a) and (b1), I suggest that it would be irrational to forsake 
childhood because, on average, children’s lives seem to be at least as fit 
for well-being as adults’ lives. I will consider three competing 
understandings of well-being: as a pleasurable state, as desire-satisfaction 
                                                            
30 A. Franklin-Hall (2013) “On Becoming an Adult: Autonomy and the Moral Relevance 
of Life’s Stages,” Philosophical Quarterly 63(251): 223-47, at 246. 
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and as the realization of objective goods. 
Childhood is often portrayed as a golden age. Some of this may 
result from a general tendency to glorify the past, but the tendency is not 
absolute. Some stages of childhood, such as the difficult part of puberty, 
are sometimes ranked as less happy than later stages of life. 
Another explanation is that children really have a remarkable ability 
to enjoy life. They can take more pleasure than adults in their sensations, 
ideas, bodies, people and places; they are more capable than adults of 
wholehearted fun and laughter. Also, most children seem less susceptible 
to some kinds of misery: They rarely, if ever, feel tired with life. They do 
not seem bothered by a sense of their own and others’ limitations and by 
the unavoidability of death, which often poison adults’ lives. Even when 
they understand that they will die one day, children – at least the popular 
wisdom goes – tend to live as if they are going to be around forever.31 
Patrick Tomlin thinks we ought to be suspicious of the above claim 
because children also tend to show more misery than adults.32 Yet, there 
might be an asymmetry between the face value of children’s and adults’ 
expression of (un)happiness: (Young) children tend to show almost all 
emotions, so we can take them at face value. Adults have been socialized 
to express mostly pleasurable emotions – indeed, sometimes to 
exaggerate expressions of subjective well-being and to repress those of ill-
being. That children show more misery than adults does not mean that 
adults experience less misery than children. 
Again, neuroscience provides an explanation for some of children’s 
hedonic abilities. Gopnik reports that very young children perceive the 
world a lot more vividly and in a less organized way than adults; their 
experience is often synesthetic. This state, which is conducive to learning 
and creativity, is also pleasurable and makes it easier for children to live in 
the moment.33 Her own comparison for what it is like to perceive the 
world as a baby or young child is “being in love in Paris for the first time 
after you’ve had three double espressos.”34 
Alternative conceptions of well-being equate it with desire-
satisfaction or the realization of objective goods. On a simple version of 
the desire-satisfaction view, children seem just as likely to enjoy well-
being as adults if they live in a world that is conducive to a good 
childhood. (However, if the view requires the satisfaction of desires that 
are stable over time and autonomously endorsed, it will exclude children.) 
Like adults, children have desires and even projects – for instance, they 
actively pursue pleasure, knowledge or friendships. It is true that access to 
                                                            
31 Brennan (2014) also discusses children’s sense of timelessness, possibility and absolute 
trust as bonuses of childhood. It seems plausible to me that all of these features protect 
children from some of the misery to which adults are vulnerable. 
32 In P. Tomlin (manuscript in progress) “Saplings or Caterpillars? Trying to Understand 
Children.” 
33 An interesting question is whether children are more likely to be happy than adults, 
other things being equal. For instance, are they more likely to enter and remain in the 
so-called state of “flow”? 
34 From Gopnik’s research profile, at: research.universityofcalifornia.edu/profiles/2012/ 
05/alison-gopnik.html 
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some of the things that children desire can be (legitimately) restricted by 
adults, but, at the same time, access to some of the things that adults 
desire are, inevitably, out of adults’ reach. Again, commonsense wisdom 
represents children’s desires as geared toward simpler goals and, as such, 
easier to satisfy than adults’ desires. 
Finally, some believe that well-being is the same as the realization of 
objective goods. Some of the goods most widely acknowledged, such as 
the attaining of various kinds of excellence, are likely to be less easily 
reachable by children than by adults. Yet, the opposite is true about other 
goods. Above I mentioned that young children may be better able than 
adults to engage in scientific and philosophical enquiry (especially if 
philosophy is understood as critical thinking rather than the development 
of complex theories). The same argument is sometimes made about 
children’s ability to engage in artistic pursuits.35 Matthews, for instance, 
writes: 
 
For many people the art or philosophy of their childhood is never equaled, let 
alone surpassed, by the art or philosophy of their adult lives. If painting or 
doing philosophy has any non-instrumental value for them, it is their child art 
and their child philosophy that have such value.36  
 
Neuropsychology suggests that children’s special artistic talent is due to 
their atypically high levels of general creativity, vivid awareness of the 
world and capacity for synesthetic experience. 
Even if Matthews is right, this does not imply that either children or 
most adults are ever successful at creating knowledge or beauty. The 
skeptic may ask what the value (other than pleasure) is of philosophical, 
scientific and artistic pursuits if one lacks the technique, discrimination 
and tenacity necessary to produce outstanding results. I assume that 
exercising a propensity to enquire into the causes of things and into the 
meaning of concepts as well as trying to create beautiful or surprising 
objects are valuable activities, independent of their outcome. Here is, in 
the words of Bertrand Russell, one explanation of why it is good to 
engage, for instance, in the activity of philosophy even if one does not get 
any closer to truth: Philosophy, 
 
while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are … greatly 
increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat 
arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled the region of liberating 
doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an 
unfamiliar aspect.37 
 
To children, these states of mind – of diminished certainty about how 
things are and vivid imagination of possibilities, of lack of arrogant 
dogmatism and of a sense of wonder – come naturally. If there is intrinsic 
value in being the kind of person who regularly enjoys such states of 
                                                            
35 Some artists seem to agree with this. Picasso is said to have claimed that “Every child 
is an artist. The problem is how to remain an artist once we grow up.” 
36 Matthews (1994: 123). 
37 B. Russell (1999) The Problems of Philosophy, New York: Dover Publications, p. 114. 
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mind, then childhood is intrinsically valuable. The goods easily available 
to children, and only rarely to adults, may or may not also be instrumental 
– for instance, they may shape future scientists or political reformers – 
but even when they fail to be instrumental they remain valuable. 
 
4. Children’s Moral Agency 
 
An obvious objection to the view I defend is that children cannot lead 
good lives, and therefore childhood cannot have intrinsic value, unless 
children have moral agency.38 The view that children are unfinished adults 
represents children as deficient in both rational and moral agency. Some 
of the discussion above explains why children have more rational agency 
than traditionally ascribed to them. I assume that full moral agency 
presupposes a degree of knowledge about the world that is out of very 
young children’s reach, as well as a higher ability to accurately imagine 
oneself in the future than most children have. 
Yet, even small children have some knowledge of the world and 
progressively acquire self-control and a sense of their self as extended in 
time. Moreover, being a moral agent also requires an adequate level of 
empathy, altruism and understanding of moral demands. Moral agents 
should be capable of understanding how other people feel and be 
disposed to help for non-self-interested reasons. This sense of “empathy” 
is sometimes discussed as “sympathy”: “sympathetic concern for a person 
involves some concern for her good and some desire to promote it.”39 I 
employ the term “empathy” since this is more widely used in the 
empirical research to which I refer. 
The same research that shows children as more imaginative and 
better learners than adults also indicates that children as young as 2 are 
capable of altruistic action and that they have higher levels of empathy 
than adults.40 A 2-year-old can understand that others feel pain that she – 
the child – does not feel, or that others desire things that she – the child – 
does not desire. The explanation for this, according to Gopnik, lies in 
part with children’s heightened curiosity about other people’s minds, 
which also makes possible children’s attempts to impose their will on 
others (and which has an obvious evolutionary explanation, given that 
children depend on others’ willingness to advance their ends). Writes 
Gopnik: “This kind of empathy demands the same sophisticated 
understanding of other people that we see in the terrible twos.”41 
Moreover, a 2-year-old is capable of caring about another person’s pain 
that she does not feel, or about another person’s desire that she does not 
share, and to try to soothe the pain or help fulfill the desire. 
Gopnik’s findings with respect to children’s empathy and altruism 
align with Matthews’ experience with children doing moral philosophy. 
                                                            
38 For the view that morality is a precondition for leading a good life, see C. Korsgaard, 
“Two Conceptions of Goodness,” The Philosophical Review 92(2): 169-95. 
39 S. Darwall (1998) “Empathy, Sympathy, Care,” Philosophical Studies 89(2-3): 261-82. 
40 Additional, older empirical research with the same conclusion is referenced in A. 
Jaworska (2007) “Caring and Full Moral Standing,” Ethics 117(3): 460-97. 
41 Gopnik et al. (2008/1999: 55). 
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He, too, notes that children are more likely to exercise empathy and pay 
attention to others than adults, although his explanation is social rather 
than biological: 
 
People become overwhelmed by, or increasingly preoccupied with their own, 
personal agendas. When that happens, even a very young and inexperienced 
child can catch us adults up short with a direct, emphatic response to, say, a 
homeless person trying to keep warm in a cardboard box under a bridge.42 
 
As in the case of children’s cognitive abilities, the relevance of these 
findings about children for their status as moral agents is not 
straightforward. The role of empathy in ethics is disputed. Few would 
deny that some ability to feel empathy is necessary for moral agency. Yet, 
there is disagreement concerning its importance relative to that of 
understanding, and acting on, principles. According to some 
philosophers, empathy as an emotional capacity to care for others is a 
sufficient condition for the possession of full moral standing.43 Theories 
of moral development inform the debate between Lawrence Kohlberg 
and Carol Gilligan concerning the stages of moral development. 
Kohlberg, who drew on work by Piaget, influentially argued that 
moral judgment develops through six stages, that moving from one stage 
to the next represents improvement and that one can only reach a stage 
after having been through the previous ones. Kohlberg called the first 
two stages pre-conventional to stress that somebody at these stages is 
mostly motivated by fear of punishment and desire for reward. Being in 
one of the next two stages, called conventional, is to be motivated by 
interpersonal relationships, to seek social approval and to desire to 
maintain social harmony. Subjects reaching the last two stages, called 
post-conventional, are motivated by their understanding of abstract 
principles, like those upheld by social-contract theory or by a Kantian-like 
requirement of universalizability. Kohlberg and his followers believed 
that children before adolescence find themselves at one of the pre-
conventional stages. If both this theory of moral development and the 
empirical beliefs about children’s motivation were right, this would 
indeed be reason to disqualify children from consideration as moral 
agents. I wish to indicate three plausible lines of resisting this conclusion. 
First, according to Gopnik and others, children as young as 2 turn 
out to be capable of motivation that best fits Kohlberg’s conventional 
stages: interest in other people’s well-being. Kohlberg himself believed 
that most adults remain at one of these intermediate levels of 
development. This means that one cannot deny some moral agency to 
children unless one is willing to deny it to most adults. 
Second, Kohlberg’s theory has been thoroughly challenged by Carol 
Gilligan within the field of psychology and by the subsequent tradition of 
the ethics of care, drawing on Gilligan and sometimes on the 18th 
century tradition of moral sentimentalism in ethics.44 The core of the 
                                                            
42 Matthews (1994: 65). 
43 Jaworska (2007). 
44 C. Gilligan (1982) In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, 
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challenge is that it is just not true that moral motivation in terms of other 
people’s needs and of the importance of preserving relationships is 
inferior to moral motivation in terms of universalizable rules. I cannot 
enter here into the details of this debate, but much of it turns on the 
belief that responding to people’s needs, independently of whether this 
advances the greatest good or respects deontic constraints, is what 
morally good people actually do. (And so, the ethics of care is often 
considered to be a form of virtue ethics.) If this belief is true, it means 
that being at the so-called conventional stages – as children often are, 
according to Gopnik and Matthews – does not mean that one is morally 
deficient. To the contrary: It means that one displays fully adequate moral 
reactions. This is in line with common morality and the tradition of moral 
sentimentalism. Moreover, the idea that others’ needs and our 
relationships with them should motivate us morally can be 
accommodated by some theories that ground morality in impartial 
principles, such as versions of utilitarianism, that acknowledge the gap 
between moral motivation and the understanding of what actually makes 
a particular action moral. 
A third line of reasoning is even more persuasive. It is misguided to 
pitch responsiveness to people’s needs against acting on impartial, 
universal moral principles. If so, Kohlberg’s taxonomy of stages of moral 
development, at least beyond the pre-conventional stages, is deeply 
flawed. It is theoretically possible, and desirable, to simultaneously act on 
moral principles and in response to others’ needs. (This is, indeed, 
suggested in Gilligan’s own later views; she often uses metaphors from 
gestalt psychology to say that we can switch between the perspective of 
impartial reasoning and the perspective of care in evaluating one and the 
same problem.) 
It remains to be shown that children are capable of understanding 
moral principles and, indeed, this is what research in developmental 
psychology indicates.45 Experiments reported by Gopnik46 suggest that 
toddlers know what conventional rules mean – that is, that there are 
social conventions that they should follow, and that rules issue 
permissions, obligations or interdictions – and that the rules can be 
changed. Children as young as 2 ½ understand that the mere fact that an 
authority figure makes a rule does not mean that that rule is morally 
acceptable. They distinguish rule breaking from what is morally 
acceptable, as suggested by the fact that toddlers answer positively the 
question: “Would it be OK to talk at naptime if the teachers all said so?” 
and negatively the question: “Would it be OK to hit other children if the 
teachers all said so?” If someone believes that rules can be changed and 
that their moral value derives from a source that is independent from the 
authority figure that makes them, that person may be said to have, if only 
implicitly, the concept of a principle in light of which conventional rules 
                                                                                                                                             
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
45 The path-breaking work on understanding the distinction between conventional rules 
and moral principles was done by E. Turiel. See (1983) The Development of Social Knowledge: 
Morality and Convention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
46 Gopnik (2009). 
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can be judged. 
All this is not to say that children’s moral agency is as robust as that of 
adults, nor that they should be attributed the same levels of responsibility 
and autonomy as we attribute to adults. Children lack the relevant 
experience and self-control. For these reasons, the range of situations in 
which it is appropriate to hold children responsible is inevitably much 
narrower than the range of situations in which it is appropriate to hold 
adults responsible because children can be held responsible, even if, in a 
narrower range of cases than adults, it seems that their moral agency 
deserves respect just like that of adults. Children, then, are not morally 
deficient in a way that would make it rational for an individual to want to 
skip childhood. Moreover, if it is true that children are more capable of 
caring about others than adults, as Gopnik and Matthews suggest, the 
transition from childhood to adulthood is likely to involve a loss in moral, 
as well as in cognitive, value. 
 
5. Adults as Defective Children? 
 
I have tried to vindicate an image of children, including very young 
children, that is familiar from many sources, starting with the Romantic 
tradition with its emphasis on children’s creativity and moral sensitivity. 
Modern-day neuroscience and developmental psychology provide a good 
basis for rejecting the image of children as mere unfinished adults. In a 
nutshell, and, again, in Gopnik’s words:  
 
Children aren’t just defective adults, primitive grown-ups gradually attaining 
our perfection and complexity. Instead, children and adults are different forms 
of Homo sapiens. They have very different, but equally complex and powerful 
minds, brains, and forms of consciousness, designed to serve different 
evolutionary functions.47 
 
This is an exaggeration. What Gopnik in fact shows is that children 
and adults excel at different things. Still, the flip side of rejecting the view 
that children are unfinished adults is that one has to accept the idea that 
adults are, in some ways, defective children. If children are better 
explorers of the world, more creative and more empathetic, this means 
that adults have lost some of children’s valuable abilities. In the relevant 
respects adults are, compared to children, defective.  
The extreme form of the Romantic view is illustrated by Peter Pan, 
who never wants to grow up. If the view of “adults as defective children” 
were both true and complete, growing up would be regrettable and Peter 
Pan’s desire the only rational attitude with respect to growing up.48 Yet, it 
is highly unconvincing that the Romantic view is both true and complete. 
Adulthood, too, has intrinsic value and affords access to goods that are 
                                                            
47 Gopnik (2009: 9). 
48 We would also need to radically rethink our social world, including the distribution of 
resources between children and adults and the demands that come with being a parent. 
James Dwyer’s (2011) thesis that children have higher moral status than adults is the 
closest defense of this view that I know. 
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only very rarely, and some of them not at all, available to children. 
Unlike the traditional view of children as unfinished adults, the 
Romantic view of adults as defective children was never meant to capture 
the full truth about the nature of childhood and adulthood; Romantics 
did not imply that adulthood is all things considered inferior to 
childhood, because they did not adopt the unlikely view that we can, 
during childhood, have access to all the range of goods available to 
human beings. Rather, they highlighted the best features of childhood in 
order to explain why we ought to protect children from too much 
responsibility.49 The belief that adults are defective children just like 
children are unfinished adults also gives credence to the view that it is 
desirable for adults to retain childlike qualities to the extent to which this 
does not interfere with adult responsibilities.50 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
If both childhood and adulthood have intrinsic and special value, it would 
not be irrational to choose one over the other unless one was of much 
greater value. Consider: There is value both in becoming a doctor and in 
becoming an artist, and the two activities afford access to very different 
goods. Therefore, other things being equal, it is rational to choose either 
of these. Similarly, taking the pill in Brennan’s experiment, or being Peter 
Pan, would both be rationally justifiable. This conclusion is not 
incompatible with the belief that adults have a duty to help children grow 
up and assume adult responsibilities. The contingent fact that adults grow 
old and frail means they are unable to care for their children endlessly. 
Even if there would be no tragedy to remain a child if one could receive 
adult care forever, in the real world it is good for children to turn into 
adults, but not by forgoing the enjoyment of childhood’s goods. 
Some will, indeed, remain convinced that the value of adulthood is 
much greater than that of childhood. They may value, above all, end 
results – a new discovery, an artistic masterpiece, the saving of thousands 
of individuals. Childhood is not the time when one can reasonably hope 
to accomplish any of these. One can believe that, whatever intrinsic value 
childhood may have, it is easily outweighed by the value of adulthood. 
But I contend that even someone who holds such a perfectionist 
conception of the good has reason to be interested in protecting the 
goods that make childhood intrinsically valuable. Childhood may be a 
predicament in some senses, but in others it is a privilege: the privilege of 
superior abilities to learn and experiment. The protection we give 
children – sometimes in the form of denying them the responsibility that 
comes with adult freedom – can and should serve a double purpose. We 
ought to advance their good qua future adults (children need protection 
                                                            
49 See, for instance J. Rousseau (1979/1762) Emile: or On Education, A. Bloom, trans., 
New York: Basic Books, p. 79: “Love childhood; promote its games, its pleasures, its 
amiable instinct. … Why do you want to deprive these little innocents of the enjoyment 
of a time so short which escapes them and of a good so precious which they do not 
know how to abuse?” 
50 I argued for this conclusion in Gheaus (2014). 
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 9, NO. 1 
UNFINISHED ADULTS AND DEFECTIVE CHILDREN: ON THE NATURE AND VALUE OF CHILDHOOD 
Anca Gheaus 
 21 
to reach adulthood and to bring to fruition some of their childhood 
potential) but also to advance their good qua children. Forcing children to 
work too much and play too little will not only make for poorer 
childhoods but probably also for worse adulthoods by interfering with 
optimal development. Moreover, a good adulthood includes the memory 
of a good childhood. The relationship between the two stages of life is in 
this sense asymmetrical: The badness of an individual’s adulthood does 
not take away from the value of a good childhood; while a bad childhood 
can always cast a shadow on the goodness of one’s future. 
On a conception of the good that includes more than the above-
mentioned perfectionist goals, then, contra Lomasky, for someone to 
mysteriously remain in the state of childhood would not be a tragedy; 
theirs would be a life very much worth living because childhood is 
intrinsically valuable. While this would not be a tragedy, it would likely be 
a loss: Since both childhood and adulthood give privileged access to 
specific goods, they are both inherently integral to an optimal life.51 
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51 Exchanges with Patrick Tomlin improved my understanding of what is at stake in the 
claim that childhood has intrinsic value. Thanks to audiences in Sheffield and London, 
Christopher Bennett, Brunella Casalini, Christine Bratu, Luara Ferracioli, Tim Fowler, 
Colin Macleod, Lindsey Porter, Sara Protasi, Norvin Richards, Anders Schinkel, Maria 
Schwartz, an anonymous reviewer of this journal and an anonymous reviewer of the 
Journal of Moral Philosophy. Work toward this article was also supported by the Swedish 
Research Council, grant no. 421-2013-1306. 
